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VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION -A NEW DEVELOP-
MENT IN INTRACORPORATE ABUSE
GEORGE D. HORNSTEINt
BLACKSTONE described dissolution of a corporation by surrender of its
franchise as "a kind of suicide." 1 Voluntary corporate death,2 however,
if not for the benefit of all the stockholders, may perhaps be more realis-
tically described as "murder"; yet it is not readily recognized as such be-
cause the motivation is not always apparent. The purpose of this article
is to view the setting of and to analyze the motives for such dissolution
as a form of corporate manipulation.
Voluntary corporate death may at present be effected through any one
of a number of procedures. It may occur not only through simple
dissolution, but also through merger or consolidation, since the last two
also involve dissolution and the corporate death of at least one pre-exist-
ing corporation.' However, liquidation, i.e., sale of all the assets of a cor-
poration, is not corporate death ' and is therefore not within the scope
of this article, unless the liquidation is followed by technical dissolution.
5
When dissolution is accomplished by a vote of all the stockholders, no
issue arises. This is outright "suicide." But if we consider the power of
less than all of the stockholders to dissolve ' a solvent, prosperous corpor-
ation when no statute controls, we find that the issue has long been sub-
ject to a division of authority both in judicial decisions ' and among legal
f Member of the New York Bar.
1. 1 BL. Comm. *485.
2. By definition, dissolution is "corporate death." See People v. North River
Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 608, 24 N. E. 834 (1890); Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas
Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 29-30, 74 Pac. 1004, 1006 (1904).
• 3. Merger results in survival of one corporation and dissolution of those which
arc absorbed. Consolidation results in dissolution of all the old corporations and creation
of a new corporation. Problems raised by merger or consolidation, and not found in
simple dissolution, are discussed in SEC REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIOATION
OF THE VoRK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REoROAN-
iZATioN COmIirEES (1938) Pt. VII, p. 526 ff.; (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 105.
4. See National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54, 73-74 (1881). But see
Combes v. Keyes, 89 Wis. 297, 311, 62 N. W. 89, 93 (1895).
5. Compare Meyerhoff v. Bankers' Securities, Inc., 105 N. J. Eq. 76, 147 At].
105 (Ch. 1929).
6. The power to merge or consolidate is strictly statutory. SEC REPORT, supra
note 3, Pt. VII, p. 526.
7. The leading case sustaining this power is Bowditch v. Jackson Co., 76 N. H.
351, 82 Ati. 1014 (1912). Contra: Kean v. Johnson, 9 N. J. Eq. 401, 422-23 (Ch. 1853).
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writers.' Where the charter sets no time limit for the existence of a cor-
poration,' most jurisdictions permit a majority (unless the charter pre-
scribes a greater percentage) to vote dissolution of the corporation, just
as they are empowered to make any other corporate decision which binds
the minority. Good faith, of course, is required in this as in all actions
which may be authorized by less than the whole of the stockholders. But
the question of whether the dissolution is in good faith, naturally a grave
issue when the corporation is a prosperous business concern, is a matter
entirely independent of the question of the power of the corporation to
dissolve.' °
The problem of the power to dissolve by less than a unanimous vote of
the stockholders has been met by legislation in every state but one." In
a dozen states, if a specified percentage of the stockholders seek dissolu-
tion, the statute requires that they apply to a designated court whose
approval is a prerequisite.' The court may then consider objections to
the proposal, and may decline to order dissolution, although the careless
language of some statutes may seem to make the court's approval manda-
tory. 3 Another type of statute authorizes a stated percentage to vote dis-
solution and provides that the matter be then brought before a court for
confirmation, but expressly limits the function of the court to a deter-
S. Warren, Voluntary Transfers of Corporate Undertakings (1917) 30 Hamv. L
REv. 335, 346. For a contrary position, see Fain, Limitations of the Statutory PLzucr
of Majority Stockholders to Dissolve a Corporation (1912) 25 HAnv. L. Rm% 677, 67S.
9. Even courts which sanction power in a majority to dissolve where the corporate
existence is unlimited rule otherwise where the charter prescribes a definite period of
existence. See Black v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130, 403-04
(Gb. 1871).
10. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the power in a majority of the stock-
holders to act without resort to the courts is not to be confused with the power of
either majority or minority to invoke the aid of an equity court to dissolve a cor-
poration when dissolution is in the interest of all the stockholders. See Hornstein,
A Remedy for Corporate Abnse -Judicial Power to WIJind up a Corporation at the
Suit of a Minority Stockholder (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 220.
11. Iowa appears to have no provision authorizing less than all the stockholders
to vote dissolution prior to the period fixed in the articles of incorporation unless a
lesser vote is authorized therein. IowA CoDE (1939) § 8363. However, a statute author-
izes the court to order dissolution "on good cause shown." Id. at § 8402. The result is
no different from that in states requiring application to the court after a specified
percentage vote in favor of dissolution.
12. MASS. ANN. LAws (Lawyers' Co-op., Supp. 1940) c. 155, § 50 (majority
vote) is illustrative of the type of statute which requires either a majority or a two-
thirds vote before application may be made to the court. An interesting statute in
Missouri varies the percentage of vote required with the grounds upon which dissolu-
tion is sought Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) c. 32, § 4562.
13. Compare Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 28, 74 Pac.
1004, 1005 (1904).
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mination of compliance with the provisions of the statute.' 4 Most statutes
do not require resort to the courts at all, but authorize the stockholders to
accomplish dissolution simply by a majority vote or better."' Scattered
statutes permit a choice of either of the latter two procedures, i.e., either
formal supervision by the court,'" or action solely by a vote of the stock-
holders, requiring a larger percentage of the stockholders under this second
method where there is no resort at all to the courts. 7 Many statutes re-
quire that a majority of the directors must first decide to dissolve and then
call a stockholders' meeting to vote and concur thereon ;i8 other statutes do
not call for a preliminary meeting of the directors.'0 For practical pur-
poses this variation is immaterial, since in every case where the statute
requires that the directors vote first, if a majority or more of the stock-
holders wish to dissolve, they can, at the next election, insure a cooperative
directorate. One state avoids this complication by requiring the directors
to submit the question of dissolution to a vote of the stockholders if re-
quested to do so by a simple majority of the stockholders, although a two-
thirds vote of the stockholders is then essential to effect dissolution.
'
Statutes authorizing dissolution by less than a unanimous vote of the
stockholders usually do not mention the necessity of good faith 2 A con-
flict in interpretation results: one isolated holding gives the statutory
majority (the percentage fixed by the statute) an absolute right to dis-
solve ;22 the overwhelming mass of decisions, however, hold that the
power of the statutory majority is subject to equitable limitations to pre-
vent abuse.2' The latter ruling produces virtually the identical situation
which we have noted exists in most jurisdictions in the absence of a stat-
ute. Thus, a majority (unless the charter or statute prescribes a greater
14. IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §§ 29-301 to 29-307; N. D. CoMN'. LAWS ANN. (1913)
§ 4565; OKLA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 9779.
15. Majority vote: CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, Supp. 1939) § 400. 60% vote: W.
VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1939) § 3092. 6621% vote (the percentage required in
most states) : DEL. REV. CODE (1935) § 2071, as amended DEL. LAWS 1941, c. 132;
N. Y. STocK CORP. LAW § 105. 75% vote: CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 3470; Micn.
ComP. LAWS (Mason, Supp. 1940) § 10135-73; The Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20
GEO. V, c. 23, §§ 117, 225. 80% vote: TEx. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925)
art. 1387.
16. FLA. CoMp. GEN. LAWS ANN. (Skillman, 1927) § 6020 (majority).
17. Id. at § 6570 (66%%).
18. See, e.g., Connecticut, supra note 15.
19. See, e.g., Michigan, supra note 15.
20. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 25-241(b).
21. A few do: e.g., Delaware and Florida statutes cited supra notes 15 and 17
("and most for the benefit of any corporation . . . that it should be dissolved.").
22. Windmuller v. Standard Distilling & Distributing Co., 114 Fed. 491 (C. C.
N. J. 1902).
23. A number of cases are cited infra notes 30, 31, 36, and 37.
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percentage) may vote dissolution of the corporation much as they may
decide any other corporate matter binding the minority. Hence, the only
material effect of the statute is that it may require more than a simple
majority or even more than the larger majority specified by the charter.
It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze in detail the circum-
stances under which dissolution is proper. Undoubtedly there are many
situations in which it is not only justified but desirable.2 4 Thus, in Eng-
land, a governmental official has the duty of striking off the rolls corpora-
tions which have outlived their usefulness.2' On the other hand, there are
equally clear cases where a proposed dissolution is fraudulent, as, for
instance, where the sales price is grossly inadequate. - ' There are other
flagrant cases where dissolution will not promote the welfare of all the
stockholders of the corporation, but will subserve some other purpose
such as "freezing" small stockholders out of a good enterprise. This may
occur, for instance, where the corporation is obviously earning money and
prospering in every way, and it is proposed, not to discontinue the busi-
ness, but to turn it over to a new corporation with a slightly different
name but with the same powers and some of the original owners.27 Were
this type of procedure to be tolerated, a minority could be ejected from
every successful venture it had helped finance.28 Furthermore, it must be
made clear that the vote in favor of dissolution may not be a result of a
democratic process. In dissolution, as in any corporate action determined
by a majority of the voting stock, where the voting stock represents little
or no capital investment in the corporation, the vote often does not indi-
cate approval by those equitably entitled to determine the question. -
It is unpredictable at what stage the court will intervene in a dissolution
proceeding and what remedy it may be expected to grant. Although the
24. See note 10 supra.
25. RiPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (192) 62. Nevertheless, voluntary
action accounts for 90% of the corporations wound up in England. PALm. Co'xpAt "
LAW (16th ed. 1938) 428.
26. Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 20 Fed. 577 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1834).
27 Fed. 625 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886), appeals dismissed, 136 U. S. 645 (189).
27. Stevenson v. Sicidesteel Lumber Co., 219 Mich. 18, 29, 183 N. W. 449, 453
(1922); Paine v. Saulsbury, 200 Mich. 58, 166 N. W. 1036 (1918); Doe Run Lead
Co. v. Maynard, 283 Mo. 646. 223 S. W. 600 ( 1920). See also cases cited infra nrtes
30 and 31.
28. It would seem that this can be done in California. See Beechwood Securities
Corp., Inc. v. Associated Oil Co., 104 F. (2d) 537, 540 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
29. This fact is recognized in some statutes which specifically give to non-voting
stock a right to vote upon certain proposals (e.q., amendments to charter, proposed
merger, or consolidation). SEC REPoRt, supra note 3, Pt. VII, pp. 473-75, 533-35.
Also see B]ERI, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE; (1928) 56, suggesting
that the voting of management stock be subjected by the courts to the same fiduciary
limitations as apply to directors in the exercise of management powers.
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judicial power to enjoin 30 or to set aside a dissolution 81 is by this time
clearly established, the courts are reluctant to grant an injunction 82 and
still more reluctant to set aside a dissolution already effected."3 Once the
dissolution is a fait accompli, the court may decline to set it aside either
because of the smallness of complainant's stock interest 84 or because of
some allegedly irretrievable action taken by the corporation after the
dissolution."
As a matter of fact, judges prefer to take the easiest way out, which
is to relegate the complainant to a simple action for money damages. They
do not hesitate to give this form of redress to those aggrieved by the vote
to dissolve, 3 merge or consolidate.37 because such relief has been made
familiar to the court in the simple situation where assets have been fraud-
ulently sold at an inadequate price.38 Practical considerations, however,
may make redress after the event illusory. In the first place, whereas
before the dissolution has been accomplished the court sometimes demands
justification from those who have proposed the change, after dissolution
the court will invariably place the burden of establishing its wrongfulness
on the complainant stockholder. And who has the burden of coming for-
ward with evidence is a particularly important factor because the coin-
plainant frequently does not have access to the books and records of the
corporation. In addition, the expense of litigation may be another insur-
mountable obstacle since'after dissolution it is no longer certain to be
recoverable on the theory of a derivative suit."0 Furthermore, though it
is true that in cases of dissolution effected through merger or consolida-
30. Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N. Y. 185, 123 N. E. 148 (1919);
Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 Pac. 1004 (1904). A Jorlior,
temporary injunctions against dissolution should be more freely granted, since rarely
can any harm, much less irreparable harm, come to the corporation from dissolution
being enjoined until a court can investigate the situation; after liquidation, delayilg
dissolution simply delays paying over cash to the stockholders.
31. Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765, 777 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906).
32. Lebold v. Inland S. S. Co., 82 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; MacFarlane
v. North American Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 178, 157 Atl. 396, 398 (1928).
33. This is clearly revealed by an occasional "Scotch verdict." Lazenby v. Inter-
national Cotton Mills Corp., 174 App. Div. 906, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1st Dep't 1916).
34. Compare Tanner v. Lindell Ry., 180 Mo. 1, 22, 79 S. W. 155, 160 (1904).
35. Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 233 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). Co lra:
Doe Run Lead Co. v. Maynard, 283 Mo. 646, 694, 223 S. W. 600, 614 (1920).
36. Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 20 Fed. 577 (C. C. S. D. N.Y. 1884), 27 Fed.
625 (C. C. S.D. N.Y. 1886), appeals disnissed, 136 U. S. 645 (1889).
37. Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765, 199 Fed. 64 (C. C. A. 8th,
1906 and 1912), on rehearing, 203 Fed. 945 (1913), cert. denied, 229 U. S. 615 (1913).
38. Wheeler v. Abilene Nat. Bank Bldg. Co., 159 Fed. 391 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908),
39. Hornstein, Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Snits (1939) 39 Col.. L.
REv. 784. See also the section of this article on "Expenses of Litigation," infra p, 79.
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tion the dissident stockholder is usually given a right of appraisal, 40 this
right is limited, costly, and often impracticable.41 Moreover, inasmuch as
it is within the power of the directors to choose the procedure to be fol-
lowed from among a number of devices---sale of assets, merger, consoli-
dation, or simple dissolution-they may, and frequently do, select simple
dissolution, a device where the remedy of appraisal is not available to the
stockholder.'
Even though the dissenting stockholders " are paid the full value of
their pro rata interest in the corporation's tangible assets, they may still
be seriously prejudiced. In the case of a publicly financed corporation,
they are inevitably forced to sacrifice their contributions toward the cost
of organizing and promoting the corporation. Stockholders are obvi-
ously not made whole when all they receive is their pro rata share of
the corporation's assets, exclusive of the expense of promotion. The
cost of floating a stock issue, which is paid by the public to the pro-
moters or underwriters when the corporation's capital is first accumulated,
is substantial. Were a corporation to be dissolved the day after organ-
ization, and before the corporation had done any business whatsoever,
the stockholder would not receive back what he had paid, but rather
a lesser sum, the amount paid less the proportionate cost of floating the
venture. Unjustified dissolution results in the loss of the value inherent
in an accumulation of capital-the life-breath of corporate enterprise.
Thus, the distribution of tangible assets can never give the stockholder his
full proportionate interest in the property of the corporation because the
asset of "accumulated capital" ceases to exist on dissolution.
Frequently, not even the stockholders opposing dissolution realize all
the implications of or the real motivation for the dissolution. Complain-
ants' usual objection is fraud, readily discernible where the proposed ex-
tinction of the corporation involves a transfer of assets to the controlling
stockholders without payment or at an inadequate price, as a result of
which the other stockholders receive less than the fair value of their share
40. Twenty-six of the thirty-one states which by general statute authorize corpora-
tions to merge or consolidate upon approval of a specified majority of stockholders
provide appraisal rights for dissenters. SEC REPORT, supra note 3, PL VII, pp. 526-27,
593. A few states now provide that resort to the appraisal statutes shall be an exclusive
remedy. CAL CiV. CODE (Deering, 1937) §369 (17); Micn. Coitp. LAws (Mason,
Supp. 1940) § 10135-54.
41. SEC REPORT, supra note 3, Pt. VII, pp. 590-610. Hearings before Stib-
committee of the Committee on Banking and Currency on S.35S0, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1940) 983.
42. SEC REPORT ON INVEST-MENT TRtss AvD IxrvEsTF'r Co. tPAN1S, H. R.
Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) Pt. III, c. 4, pp. 480-Sl.
43. The term "dissenting stockholders" is no longer synonymous with "minority
stockholders." Separation of ownership and control may result in a majority of those
who have invested in the enterprise falling under the description of "dissenting sto:-
holders."
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of the corporate property.44 A second most common ground of opposi-
tion is that the object of the dissolution is the ousting of an "uncongenial"
minority from a prosperous corporation.40 But just as important as these
flagrant, provable objections may be a motivation which, by its nature,
cannot be the subject of proof, namely, a desire on the part of the man-
agement to avoid being held accountable for misdeeds. Wrongdoers can
no longer expect dissolution of the corporation to bar completely suits
against themselves for misconduct. But although dissolution no longer
gives them immunity, its effects may be almost as desirable from their
point of view. In the first place, in some states it cuts down the ordinary
statute of limitations. Secondly, it permits defendants to invoke the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens, which, if applied, bars suit outside the
state of incorporation. This is, in practice, an effective deterrent, since
few stockholders will undergo the expense and inconvenience of asserting
their claims in a foreign jurisdiction. Finally, it reduces the likelihood
of suit to redress a wrong to a corporation since the possibility exists that
the individual stockholder may recover only the damage to himself per-
sonally and that he will then be obliged to bear alone the entire expense
of the litigation. These possibilities we shall now consider in some detail.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The first unsuspected motive to be studied arises from the fact that in
some states dissolution enables the delinquents to cut down the statute of
limitations on claims against themselves. No longer can it be doubted
that in many corporations' causes of action against the management and
controlling interests are concealed." The ordinary statute of limitations
44. Jones v. Missouri-Edison- Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906);
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N. Y. 185, 123 N. E. 148 (1919). States
which bar reclassification of stock (e.g., elimination of accumulated dividends) by direct
amendment of the corporate charter [Keller v. Wilson, 190 Atl. 115 (Del. 1936)]
permit the same result to be accomplished if the device of merger or consolidation is
employed, even though the merger be with a wholly-owned subsidiary. Federal United
Corp. v. Havender, 11 A. (2d) 331 (Del. 1940).
45. Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 Pac. 1004 (1904).
Recently, a number of investment trusts utilized the practice of acquiring a controlling
interest in corporations and then dissolving them; the large number of dissolutions,
and the Securities and Exchange Commission's study thereof, resulted in the official
conclusion that "the device of dissolution becomes essentially a method by which
minority stockholders of the acquired corporations may be eliminated from the enter-
prise and the bulk of its assets absorbed by the parent company." SEC REoRT, supra
note 42, Pt. III, c. 4, p. 480. Generally, see id. at pp. 459-512; Hearings, supra note
41, at 976.
46. SEC REPORT, sipra note 3 (1937) Pt. I, pp. 4, 157-60, 191, 863-74, 885, 899;
Pt. II, pp. 14, 187, 225, 246, 496. In England, the corporation law expressly provides
that on the winding up of a company, whether voluntary or involuntary, the court may,
on the application of the liquidator or any contributory (e.g., stockholder), examine into
the affairs of the company and determine whether any misfeasance or breach of trust
(Vol. 51 : 64
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starts running only when such causes of action are discovered,47 the
ordinary period on legal claims being six years, and on equitable claims
ten years.4s Where a state statute places a special limit on the period of
time after dissolution within which suits on behalf of the corporation can
be instituted, a new shorter period of limitations results from dissolution.
At common law, dissolution terminates the corporation's existence as
an entity. Pending actions abate4" and new actions cannot be begun."
Statutes, therefore, have been enacted in most states extending the cor-
porate existence for certain specified purposes, usually for all purposes
other than continuing the business for which the corporation was origin-
ally established. Such legislation, which is constitutional even if enacted
after creation of the corporation,51 simply makes the dissolution of the
corporation conditional. The corporate existence is not immediately extin-
guished but is protracted for a period (limited or unlimited as the statute
may provide) with special reference to the prosecution of suits by or
against it and the settlement of its affairs. These statutes, as may be ex-
pected, differ considerably in the various states.
Many states, including California,3 New York, 4 and Ohio, 3 have
statutes directing that a dissolved corporation shall continue as an entity
without any time limit, for the purpose of enabling it to wind up its affairs
has been committed by any of its officers or directors. The Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20
GEO. V, c. 23, §§ 276-77. An occasional American statute endeavors to preserve bouls
and records of a corporation by prohibiting their destruction within ten years fr.,m
charter expiration or dissolution. MIcH. Corn,. L.%ws (Mason, Supp. 1940) § 10135-77.
47. Compare MicH. Co ip. LAws (Mason, Supp. 1940) § 10135-47 (six years from
the date of delinquency or two years from the time when delinquency is discovered,
whichever shall sooner occur).
48. See (1941) 41 Co. L. REv. 686.
49. See Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U. S. 257, 259 (1927);
The Greyhound, 6S F. (2d) 832, 834 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
50. At early common law, upon the dissolution of a corporation, debts to or from
it were totally extinguished, realty in the name of the corporation reverted to the
grantor, and personalty escheated to the sovereign. I Br- Comtm. -4S4; see Fox v.
Horah, 36 N. C. 358, 361 (1841). This common law doctrine originated in the days
of municipal and ecclesiastical corporations, when modern business corporations with
stockholders were unknown. "And it is now well settled, both in England and in
this country, that equity will, upon the dissolution of a corporation by the e.\piration
of its charter or otherwise, impound its property real and personal and appropriate it,
first to the payment of its debts, and then for the benefit of the stockholders. The law
now is, independently of statute, that upon the civil death of a corporation, its real
estate does not revert to the original owners, the debts due to and from it are not
extinguished, and its personal property does not vest in the State." O'Connor v. City
of Memphis, 74 Tenn. 730, 732 (1881).
51. "The truth is, there is no such thing as a vested right to do wrong." See
Foster v. President of The Essex Bank, 16 .Mass. 245, 273 (1819).
52. See Partan v. Niemi, 288 Mass. 111, 113, 192 N. E. 527, 528 (1934).
53. CAL. Crv. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 399.
54. N. Y. Gmx. CoRP. LAw § 29, and N. Y. STocK Con. L-,w § 105(s.
55. OHio CODE Axzz. (Throckmorton, 1940) § 86234-0.
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and of prosecuting and defending suits, whether begun before or after
dissolution." A typical form, which appears in New Jersey, reads as
follows:
All corporations, whether they expire by their own limitation or
be annulled by the legislature or be otherwise dissolved, shall be
continued bodies corporate for the purposes of prosecuting and de-
fending suits by or against them, of enabling them to settle and close
their affairs, of disposing of and conveying their property and of
dividing their capital, but not for the purpose of continuing the busi-
ness for which they were established."
Other statutes, not quite so explicit. simply authorizing the corporation
to continue to act for the pur)ose of winding up its affairs, 8 have some-
times been interpreted to have the same effect.") Another variation em-
powers the court, on application by a creditor or stockholder of a dissolved
corporation, to appoint a receiver to "prosecute and defend in the name of
the corporation or otherwise all such suits as may be necessary or
proper." "o
A second group of states,"1 including Delaware,0 2 has statutes impos-
ing a time limit-three years-for continuation of the corporate entity
56. Similar statutes are CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 3373; TENN. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1938) § 3757; W. VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1937) § 3095. (The Tennessee
statute is limited to prosecution of suits by the corporation.)
57. N. J. STAT. ANN. (West, 1939) tit. 14, § 14:13-4; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Court-
right, 1929) § 32-162; S. C. CODE (1932) § 7709.
58. Amz. CODE ANN. (1939) § 53-308; IowA CODE (1939) § 8392; Ky. Acts
1938, c. 94, p. 467.
59. Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 533, 537 (Ct. Cl. 1936),
cert. dismissed, 299 U. S. 510 (1936) ; Castle's Adm'r v. Acrogen Coal Co., 145 Ky.
591, 140 S. W. 1034 (1911); cf. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. VanWinkle, 221 Fed.
590 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915), cert. denied, 241 U. S. 670 (1916) (statutory extension held
limited to a "reasonable time").
60. Italics supplied. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, Supp. 1939) § 17-3607.
Other statutes, while permitting the prosecution of suits at any lime, unfortunately
throw in doubt the important procedural question whether the suit is to be on behalf
of the corporation as an entity, or on behalf of the complainant stockholders as
individuals. "In and by the corporate name of such dissolved corporation for the use
of the party entitled to receive the proceeds of any such suit." NED. CQmr. STAr,
(1929) §24-112; NEE. ComP. STAT. (Supp. 1939) §24-113; Wyo. REv. STAT. AN .
(Courtright, 1931) §28-1109. Cf. Schmitt & Bro. Co. v. Mahoney, 60 Neb. 20, 82
N.W. 99 (1900).
61. ARx. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) §2203; Ga. Laws Extra Session 1937-1938,
§ 36, p. 242; MAss. ANN. LAws (Lawyers' Co-op. 1933) c. 155, § 51; Mcui. Comr.
LAws (Mason, Supp. 1940) § 10135-75; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1938) c. 116, § 63; VT.
PUB. LAws (1933) §5867. But cf. DEL. REV. CODE (1935) §2075; see Harned v.
Beacon Hill Real Estate Co., 9 Del. Ch. 411, 423, 84 Atl. 229, 235 (1912).
62. DEL. REV. CODE (1935) §2074, as amended by Del. Laws 1941, c. 132, reads
as follows:
"All corporations, whether they expire by their own limitation, or are
otherwise dissolved, shall nevertheless be continued for the term of three
[Vol. 51 : 64
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after dissolution. Such statutes expressly continue the corporate existence
until final judgment in actions begun within the three-year period.
A third group of state statutes limits the time allowed for the action
even more severely than would appear on their faceF This type of statute
continues the corporation as a body corporate-usually for the term of
three years-for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits, but,
unlike the Delaware type, does not expressly authorize prosecution to a
final judgment of actions begun within the three-year period. Several
courts have held that, unless the statute expressly provides otherwise, all
suits not concluded prior to the expiration of the three years must be held
to abate, leaving responsibility for the unreasonableness of this procedure
to the legislature.6 4
Some comparable statutes may be included in this last group. One
statute, while specifying three years after dissolution as the period for
which the existence of a corporation is to be continued to settle its affairs,
permits the court to extend this period upon petition by the corporation;C
another, upon petition by a creditor or stockholder ;" another, if a receiver
has been appointed.17 Still another statute (designating five years as the
period) permits the court to extend this period for an additional five years,
years from such expiration or dissolution bodies corporate for the purpose of
prosecuting and defending suits by or against them, and of enabling them
gradually to settle and close their business, to dispose of and convey their
property, and to divide their capital stock but not for the purpose of con-
tinuing the business for which said corporation shall have been established;
provided, however, that with respect to any action, suit, or proceeding begun
or commenced by or against the corporation prior to such expiration or dis-
solution and with respect to any action, suit or proceeding begun or com-
menced by or against the corporation within three years after the date of
such expiration or dissolution, such corporation shall only for the purpose of
such actions, suits or proceedings so begun or commenced be continued
bodies corporate beyond said three-year period and until any judgments,
orders, or decrees therein shall be fully executed."
63. FLA. Comp. GEN. LAws ANN. (Skillman, 1927) §§ 6021, 6571; ME. Rv. STAT.
(1930) c. 56, § 82; N-v. Com. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 1664; N. H. PuB. LAws (1926)
c. 225, § 76; Wis. STAT. (1939) § 181.02. The period is five years in Om- Co!I.. LAws
AN. (1940) § 77-259.
64. Maine Shore Line RLIL v. Maine Central R.R., 92 Me. 476, 43 Ad. 113 (1899);
Boston Tow Boat Co. v. Medford Nat. Bank, 228 Mass. 484, 117 N. E. 928 (1917);
Thornton v. Marginal Frt. Ry., 123 Mass. 32 (1877); G. M. Standifer Constr. Corp.
v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 78 F. (2d) 285 (C. C.A. 9th, 1935) (applying a five-year
Oregon statute).
65. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) § 1193 (3 years unless so extended).
66. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie & Sublett, 1936) §§ 3310, 3813.
67. TEX. ANN. Rav. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1389. Massachusetts and
North Carolina at one time had similar provisions. See Thornton v. Marginal Frt.
Ry., 123 Mass. 32, 34-35 (1877); VonGlahn v. DeRosset, 81 N. C. *467, 475 (1879).
19411
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
without specifying who may make the application." The English Com-
panies Act may also be classed in this group since it directs that the court
may, at any time within two years after the date of the dissolution, declare
the dissolution void on application by any person who appears to the court
to be interested. Such a person may thereupon institute such proceedings
as he might have taken had the company not been dissolved."
A fourth group of states makes no provision for continuance of the
life of a corporation after dissolution. In this class are the statutes based
on the Uniform Business Corporation Act,70 and similar statutes which
merely authorize those who were directors at the time of dissolution to
sue as trustees on any claim of the corporation, and to be sued to the extent
of the corporate property that shall come into their hands.7' These statutes
simply restate the equity principle of the so-called "trust fund" theory,
which would now probably prevail even in the absence of the statute,
namely, that the surviving assets are a trust fund for the creditors and
stockholders.72 The last mentioned situation, where there are no statutory
provisions with respect to survival of rights of the corporation after
dissolution, apparently prevails in a number of states. This includes some
statutes whose provisions, in other respects comprehensive, fail to extend
the corporate existence of corporations voluntarily dissolved,"3 and others
which direct that dissolution "shall not take away or impair any remedy
68. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 7069. This statute excludes from its opera-
tion dissolution by judicial decree. See Roe v. Durham, 195 Ala. 584, 586, 71 So. 109,
110 (1916).
69. The Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 GEO. V, c. 23, § 294.
70. Sections 49-60; LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1939) §§ 1133-1142; MiNN. STAT.
(Mason, Supp. 1940) §§7492-45 to 7492-55; WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, Supp.
1940) §§ 3803-48 to 3803-59.
71. COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 41, §62; Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932)
c. 32, §4561; N. D. Comp. LAws ANN. (1913) §4567; OKLA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931)
§ 9788; S. D. CODE (1939) § 11.0903. The foregoing provisions resemble § 400 of the
California Civil Code prior to an amendment in 1929 [CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931)
§ 400 n.].
72. See Crossman v. Vivienda Water Co., 150 Cal. 575, 579, 89 Pac. 335, 336 (1907)
see also note 50 supra.
73. Statutes extending the period for corporations whose corporate existence is
terminated in a specified manner may be interpreted not to apply to other types. IND.
STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 25-243 ("whose term of existence as fixed by the articles
of incorporation has expired"); Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 4171 ("after its charter
has expired or been annulled"); UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 18-1-2 ("expire by
limitation or by forfeiture"). This may also be the interpretation where the language
of a statute intended to be remedial is not perfectly clear. A statute which purported
to extend the corporate existence of "all corporations whose charters shall expire by
their own limitation, or shall be annulled by forfeiture or otherwise" (italics supplied)
was held not to include a corporation voluntarily dissolved. Jacobs v. E. Bement's Sons,
161 Mich. 415, 126 N. W. 1043 (1910) ; the statute has since been reworded, Micr.
Comtp. LAWS (Mason, Supp. 1940) § 10135-75.
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given against such corporation," I but leave uncovered the question of
suits on belialf of the corporation. In statutes of the second and third
groups (either expressly authorizing or omitting to provide for prosecu-
tion to a final judgment of suits begun within the limited period of time),
after the expiration of the period within which suits might be brought in
the name of the corporation, the similar question of suability is resolved by
the above-mentioned "trust fund" theory."'
Statutes frequently make provision not only for suits instituted after
dissolution but also for the continuance of suits pending at the time of
dissolution. While a few states make no provision whatsoever for this
contingency,7" most states either provide that the dissolution be "suggested
on the record" and the action continued,77 or simply direct that pending
actions shall not abate.7 Under the former type of statute, where the cor-
poration ceases to be a party to the action, the question arises of who will
bear the expense of the suit. If judgment is to be in favor only of the
complainant stockholder, reimbursement for his expenses is questionable. '
Moreover, if the pending suit be compromised, as so often occurs, another
stockholder, attempting to bring suit subsequently, may be barred in the
absence of a statute authorizing suits subsequent to dissolution.8
These statutory variations present a problem in conflict of laws. The
rule is far from settled as to which law governs where there- is a difference
between the law of the forum and the law of the state of incorporation
with respect to the power of a corporation, as such, to sue or be sued after
74. Italics supplied. ILL. STAT. ANN. (Callaghan, 1934) §32.096; PA. STva. AN:N;.
(Purdon, Supp. 1941) tit. 15, § 2852-1111. These statutes contain additional provisions
that such suits may be prosecuted aqainst the corporation in its corporate name, but, on
the other hand, require that they be brought within two years fron the date of dissolu-
tion. The present state of the Illinois law is reviewed in Billiard Table Mfg. Corp. v.
First-Tyler Bank & Trust Co., 16 F. Supp. 990 (N. D. IN. Va. 1936); Chicago Riding
Club v. Avery, 305 Ill. App. 419, 27 N. E. (2d) 636 (1940).
75. Diamond State Iron Co. v. Husbands, 8 Del. Ch. 205, 220, 63 Ad. 240, 244
(1898); see Lehrich v. Sixth Avenue Bancorporation, Inc., 251 App. Div. 391, 393, 2N0
N. Y. Supp. 358, 362 (1st Dep't 1937).
76. So in Louisiana and presumably the other states following the Uniform Busi-
ness Corporation Act. McCoy v. State Line Oil & Gas Co., 180 La. 579, 157 So. 116
(1934). To prevent injustice, the court may, however, annul the certificate of dissolu-
tion. Id. at 582, 157 So. at 118. This procedure is expressly authorized in the English
statute. See note 69 supra.
77. See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, Supp. 1939) § 17-3609; MD. AN:N.
CoIos (Flack, 1939) art. 23, § 102. "Suggestion on the record," oral or written, is the
prescribed practice in some states for advising the court of the death of a party; oppos-
ing counsel admit the fact, if true, and the court then issues the appropriate order.
78. D.t.R. -v. CoDE (1935) § 2074, as amended D. LAws 1941, c. 132; N. Y. STcOO
CoRP. LAW §§ 90, 91(6).
79. See the section of this article on "Expenses of Litigation," infra p. 79.
80. Compare (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1474.
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dissolution.8' The forum may permit post-dissolution suits, and the domi-
cile make no provision therefor, or vice versa. Both may permit suits but
may differ as to the period within which suits must be brought. Courts'
opinions on this issue derive from different theories. For one thing, it is
uniformly believed that if the state of incorporation provides for contin-
uance of the corporation as a juristic person for the purpose of suit, no
problem arises, since such a domiciliary law is as much a part of the cor-
porate charter as if it were actually included in the charter, and it has as
much extraterritorial effect as the charter itself and the statute under
which the corporation was created. -82 On that theory, however, termina-
tion as well as continuance of the corporation for the purpose of suit might
be regarded as the fundamental law of the corporation and solely within
the domain of the state of incorporation. 83 Yet the Supreme Court of
the United States has recently held that a state may declare, as a condi-
tion upon which a foreign corporation is admitted to do business, that
all causes of action, maintainable by or against the corporation in the cor-
porate name, shall survive dissolution.84 The result of these conflicting
views is that some courts consider only the law of the state of incorpora-
tion,85 even though the forum has a statute prescribing a shorter period
or makes no provision at all for post-dissolution suits ;80 other courts con-
sider also the law of the forum, 7 sometimes on the ground that the terms
laid down by the local legislature constitute the conditions upon which
the foreign corporation was permitted to do business ;88 and occasional
decisions consider only the law of the forum,"' but they are clearly
81. Compare RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 158.
82. Waite, C. J., in Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222, 225-26 (1880).
83. Compare Taft, C. J., in Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U. S.
257, 259-60 (1927).
84. Clark v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112, 119, 128 (1934). The question was presented
under U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1.
85. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U. S. 257 (1927); see Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 23 F. Supp. 351, 352 (D. Del. 1938), aff'd, 115 F. (2d)
268, 270 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
86. Dundee Mtge. Co., Ltd. v. Hughes, 89 Fed. 182 (C. C. D. Ore. 1898); Perry
v. Western Motor Car Co., 279 Ill. App. 195 (1935).
87. See Castle's Adm'r v. Acrogen Coal Co., 145 Ky. 591, 595, 140 S. W. 1034, 1036
(1911); Olds v. City Trust Safe Deposit Co., 185 Mass. 500, 505, 70 N. E. 1022, 1024
(1904); Rodgers v. Adriatic Fire Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 34, 38, 42 N. E. 515, 516 (1895) ;
Lehrich v. Sixth Avenue Bancorporation, Inc., 251 App. Div. 391, 395, 296 N. Y. Supp.
358, 363 (1st Dep't 1937); DuPont Engineering Co. v. John P. Harvey Constr. Co,,
156 Va. 582, 591, 158 S. E. 891, 894 (1931). N. Y. C. P. A. § 977b(19) is an illustrative
statute.
88. Clark v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112, 119 (1934) ; see Sinnott v. Hanan, 214 N. Y,
454, 458, 108 N. E. 858, 859 (1915).
89. See Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384, 389 (1878) ; Sinnott v. Hanan, 156 App.
Div. 323, 325, 141 N. Y. Supp. 505, 507-08 (2d Dep't 1913), rei/d, 214 N. Y. 454, 108
N. E. 858 (1915).
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erroneous and will probably not be followed. Of course the consequence
of these variations in conflict of laws rules is. in some instances, to give
the wrongdoer a significant tactical advantage.
The general theory of limiting the time within which suits must be com-
menced is in furtherance of a policy to discourage litigation. Whatever
be the merits of this policy in general, to put it within the power of a
wrongdoer to cut this time down still further in situations where it is also
in his power to conceal from those injured knowledge that any wrong has
been committed constitutes a most regrettable violation of our notions of
justice.
FORUM NON CONVENIENS
To the fairly predictable consequence of dissolution-a shorter statute
of limitations in certain states- must be added a second possible effect
inspiring dissolution. This is the chance that, either as a matter of power
or as a matter of expediency, suit on behalf of a dissolved corporation
may not be entertained except in the courts of the state of incorporation.
Where the applicable statutory authority, either in the state of incor-
poration or in the forum, empowers a corporation to sue after dissolution,
and the corporation, through its duly authorized representatives, the
Trustees in Dissolution, refuses or fails to do so, a stockholder of the
dissolved corporation may maintain a derivative suit in the name of the
corporation, either in the state of incorporation 0' or in any state where
jurisdiction can be obtained. The long line of New York cases so hold-
ing" 1 is, however, striking evidence of the persistence of defendants'
attempts to induce the courts to change this ruling. An occasional lower
court decision declining to entertain jurisdiction 12 encourages malefactors
90. See Michel v. Betz, 108 App. Div. 241, 243, 95 N. Y. Supp. 844, 84 (1st Dep't
1905).
91. Druckerman v. Harbord, 174 Misc. 1077, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 595 (Sup. Ct. 1940)
(N. J. corp.); Hamm v. Christian Herald Corp., 236 App. Div. 639, 260 N. Y. Supp.
743 (1st Dep't 1932) (N. J. corp.) ; Guggenheimer v. Beaver Board Co., 136 Misc. 511,
240 N. Y. Supp. 15 (Sup. Ct. 1930), aff'd, 229 App. Div. 717, 241 N. Y. Supp. 877 (1st
Dep't 1930) (Del. corp.); Major v. American Malt & Grain Co., 110 Misc. 132, 181
N. Y. Supp. 152 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (N. J. corp.); Holmes v. Camp, 186 App. Div. 075,
175 N. Y. Supp. 349 (1st Dep't 1919), aff'd, 227 N. Y. 635, 126 N. E. 910 (1919) (.Mo.
corp.).
92. See, e.g., Hamm v. Christian Herald Corp., re,'d in Appellate Dhrision, 236
App. Div. 639, 260 N. Y. Supp. 743 (1st Dep't 1932). As late as 1919, a leading tet
did state the rule to be: "Where, however, a foreign corporation has ceased to e.'ist, a
resident stockholder cannot maintain on its behalf an action to compel a restoration of
its property, but relief should be sought in the courts of the state of its creation." FLMtcu-
Fr, Co PoRATio.s (1st ed. 1919) §5805, pp. 9693-9(. The case cited as authority for
this rule was distinguished in Holmes v. Camp, 186 App. Div. 675, 175 N. Y. Supp. 349
(1st Dep't 1919), and this rule does not appear in the corresponding section (§8444)
of the current (1933) edition of FLErcHER
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to employ dissolution in the hope that they may win a similar ruling and
thereby bar a suit to redress past wrongs.
But even if the stockholder can sue, it must not be forgotten that
the corporation must be made a party to the suit,9 and that dis-
solution makes much more difficult service of process upon itY4 Even the
question of whom to serve in order to perfect jurisdiction is often unset-
tled. In the absence of statutes directing the manner of service, 5 it is a
perplexing question whether service should be made upon the liquidating
trustees of the dissolved corporation. or upon the persons upon whom
process could have been served before the dissolution. 7 Still more uncer-
tain is the question whether jurisdiction over a foreign corporation can
be obtained by service upon some previously designated representative
such as the Secretary of State.
The question of power in the forum to entertain a suit after dissolu-
tion suggests its inevitable corollary, the question of expediency. Disso-
lution does increase the likelihood that the court may be persuaded, as a
matter of expediency, to relegate jurisdiction over the subject matter to
another forum-the courts of the state where the corporation was tech-
nically created. Almost invariably, in derivative suits on behalf of a
dissolved corporation, the defendants plead as an affirmative defense the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, namely, that upon dissolution there
should be relegated to the courts of the state of incorporation both the
question of the propriety of dissolution and of the duty of the Trustees
in Dissolution to bring action. It must be remembered that it is usually
impossible to obtain jurisdiction over the person of any of the guilty par-
ties in a state such as Delaware, where so many corporations are incorpor-
ated, but where the directors rarely reside. Thus, recognition of this plea
93. Security Trust Co. of Rochester v. Pritchard, 201 App. Div. 142, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 486 (4th Dep't 1922); Camp v. Taylor, 19 Atl. 968 (N. J. Ch. 1890). Indications
contra that the dissolved corporation need not be joined are collected in Comment (1931)
40 YALE L. J. 1081, and in Winer, Jurisdiction over the Beneficiary Corporation its Stock-
holders' Suits (1935) 22 VA. L. Rzv. 153, n. 2. Non-joinder of a foreign corporation
would be expressly authorized by the passage of! proposed N. Y. C. P. A. § 193a, sug-
gested in LAw REvIsIoN Com.us'N LEaxs. Doc. (1941) No. 65 (I).
94. Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant corporation was among
the objections urged in a number of the cases cited notes 90 and 91 supra.
95. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1937) §402a. The statute may authorize
service by publication. Fairfax Bldg. Co. v. Oldknow, 46 Ga. App. 281, 167 S. E. 538
(1933).
96. Holmes v. Camp, 227 N. Y. 635, 126 N. E. 910 (1919); cf. O'Brien v. King,
258 App. Div. 504, 17 N. Y. S. (2d)' 44 (1st Dep't 1940).
97. See Castle's Adm'r v. Acrogen Coal Co., 145 Ky. 591, 596, 140 S. W. 1034, 1036
(1911).
98. U. S. Truck Co. v. Pennsylvania Surety Corp., 259 Mich. 422, 243 N. W. 311
(1932) (service invalid). Contra: Kelly v. International Clay Products Co., 9 Pa. D.
& C. 704 (1927), aff'd, 291 Pa. 383, 140 AtI. 143 (1928) (Del. corp.).
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would effectively destroy the corporation's claim. Even in those rare cases
where the individual defendants are residents of a state such as Delaware,
they could leave that state immediately upon the dissolution, and then be
immune from suit in every other state where this doctrine is recognized.
Despite the increasing unpopularity of the doctrine of forum non con-
zeniens, some misfeasant directors doubtless determine to dissolve a cur-
poration on the chance that even if a remedial suit be brought, the disso-
lution will cause it to be dismissed by a judge receptive of the plea that
the action seeks to involve the court in the internal management of a
foreign corporation. Since stockholders ordinarily will not undertake
the expense and greatly increased risk"0 of asserting their claims in
a foreign jurisdiction, refusal by the court of the forum to entertain a
derivative suit will usually frustrate all attempts to redress even the most
flagrant wrongs.
EXPENSES OF LITIGATION
A third consideration which may inspire dissolution is that suits against
the wrongdoers will be discouraged because a complainant may be re-
quired to bear the entire cost of suit himself. This may result if the court,
instead of awarding judgment to the corporation, ultimately should hold
that judgment be given to the complainant stockholder as an individual,
and thereby prevent him from receiving contribution towards the expense
of the suit from his fellow stockholders.
In the case of a corporation which will not itself bring suit to redress
a wrong to it, courts originally had the choice of granting relief to the
stockholders either (a) by permitting each stockholder to maintain an
individual suit for his aliquot share of what the corporation would have
received, or (b) by permitting any stockholder to institute suit on behalf
of the corporation to recover the funds for it, thus benefitting all the
stockholders. French law employs the first alternative, 10 even though it
must result, if successful, in a multiplicity of suits."' The second alter-
native is the principle, ordinarily applied in Anglo-American law. that if
a corporation has been injured and should sue, but refuses to sue because
it is under the control of those who have wronged it, a stockholder may
maintain a suit in equity on behalf of the corporation to recover the funds
for it; and conversely a stockholder may not sue individually to recover
99. In states where statutes cater to incorporators, the courts are reluctant to render
decisions which may lessen the state's popularity. See, e.g., Davis v. Louisville G. & E.
Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 At. 654 (1928); Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A. (2d)
331 (Del. 1940).
100. Houpix. C. ET BosvIEux, H., TPAUITL Gi.NiJRAL THnoRIQUE ET PRnTv2VUL DFUs
SOCrIT S CrVIES ET COMMERCIALES ET DES AssociATIONs (7th ed. 1935) II, §§ 1364-139;
D_viD, L. PRoTEcnoN DES MINORITLS DANS LES SociLTLs rA AcTioN.s (1929) 162-0.
101. Other consequences of disregarding the corporate entity are sugge-sted in Gal-
lagher v. Germania Brewing Co., 53 Minn. 214, 54 N. W. 1115 (1893).
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his proportionate share of the loss sustained by the corporation.102 This
general principle is not without exception, however. In a few instances
where the exigencies of the case required it, a court has granted the plain-
tiff stockholder individual relief in the form of a decree that his recovery
be an aliquot share of the total damage to the corporation. So, for exam-
ple, individual relief is given where necessary to avoid a benefit to a party
not entitled to it,'03 or where necessary to assure relief to the complainant,
yet avoid circuity of action.1
0 4
In the case of an undissolved corporation the exceptibns to this general
principle have been rare and strictly limited.' Will dissolution constitute
another exception? Some decisions hold that after a corporation has been
dissolved, a suit on its behalf is still the only type of action which can be
maintained for damage to the corporation, and that a suit by a stockholder
in his individual capacity must be dismissed.'0° The overwhelming mass
of decisions, however, simply state that the stockholder of a dissolved
corporation may maintain a derivative suit.107 And a few hold that, at the
request of the complaining stockholder, individual redress may be given
directly to him.0 8
Defendants naturally urge that after a corporation has been dissolved,
a stockholder (if he can still be so called) can recover only his pro rata
share, and cannot recover assets for a corporation which has no use for
them. One state statute seems to require this interpretation,' ° and it
may be the logical ruling where suit is begun after expiration of the period
set by statute for continued corporate existence."10
102. See Hornstein, supra note 39, at 785.
103. Brown v. DeYoung, 167 Ill. 549, 47 N. E. 863 (1897); Matthews v. Headley
Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 523, 100 AtI. 645 (1917) ; Joyce v. Congdon, 114 Wash. 239, 195
Pac. 29 (1921).
104. Dill v. Johnston, 72 Okla. 149, 179 Pac. 608 (1919) ; Eaton v. Robinson, 19 R. I.
146, 31 AtI. 1058, 32 Atl. 339 (1895).
105. Some of the exceptional cases were analyzed and limited in Eshleman v. Keenau,
194 AtI. 40 (Del. Ch. 1937), aff'd, 2 A. (2d) 904 (1938).
106. Watts v. Vanderbilt, 45 F. "(2d) 968 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) ; Anderson v. Derrick,
26 P. (2d) 463 (Cal. 1933), aff'd on rehearing, 220 Cal. 770, 32 P. (2d) 1078 (1934). Cf.
Brock v. Poor, 216 N. Y. 387, 111 N. E. 229 (1915) (corporation not technically dis-
solved).
107. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 91.
108. Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 20 Fed. 577 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1884); Ward
v. Graham-Jones Motor Co., 74 Colo. 145, 219 Pac. 776 (1923); Alexander v. Quality
Leather Goods Corp., 150 Misc. 577, 269 N. Y. Supp. 499 (Sup. Ct. 1934). Similarly,
where complainant asks restitution to the corporation, or, in the alternative, direct relief
to himself. Sale v. Ambler, 335 Pa. 165, 6 A. (2d) 519 (1939).
109. Miss. CoDE ANN. (1930) § 4172.
110. Compare Baldwin v. Johnson, 95 Tex. 85, 88, 65 S. W. 171, 172 (1901) ; Ran-
sey v. Rosenthal, 242 App. Div. 526, 275 N. Y. Supp. 783 (1st Dep't 1934) (after expira-
tion of period of prolonged existence, former stockholder may bring a representative
suit on behalf of all former stockholders).
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The practical import of this problem .. is shown in an early ruling in
Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co.," 2 a case so frequently cited that a
brief statement is in order. The majority stockholders of Corporation A
owned all the stock of Corporation B, and voted the consolidation of the
two corporations to form Corporation C on a basis grossly inequitable to
the minority stockholders of Corporation 4. Minority stockholders of Cor-
poration A instituted a derivative suit and sought (1) the dissolution of
Corporation C, an accounting of all property belonging to Corporation A
in the hands of Corporation C, a decree for the recovery of the same from
Corporation C on behalf of and for the use and benefit of Corporation A,
and the rehabilitation of Corporation A; or (2) in the alternative, that an
accounting be taken and the true value of complainants' stock in Corpora-
tion A be ascertained and adjudged a lien upon the property of Corpora-
tion C. The court said that the action of the majority stockholders bad
been a fraud upon the minority stockholders of Corporation A and that it
"was not so irrevocably dissolvqd that its rehabilitation is beyond the
power of a court of chancery." '  The Master to whom the case was
referred reported, however, that rehabilitation of Corporation A was, as a
practical matter, impossible since the corporations were public utilities,
and he simply ordered paid to the minority a sum supposed to constitute
the fair value of their share." 4 But at the conclusion of the litigation,
which had lasted thirteen years, the court, with respect to compensation
for plaintiff's counsel, declined to award counsel fees and expenses upon
the basis of a recovery of $3,225,000 in the name of Corporation .4, say-
ing it "is not restored or rehabilitated, and the ascertainment of the pro-
portion to be assigned to it of the value of the consolidated properties is
but a step in the process of determining the individual rights of appel-
lants." "' The result was that the successful plaintiffs were forced to pay
their counsel over $100,000 out of their own pockets. Since the com-
plainants were held entitled to have the corporation rehabilitated, they
might well have been compensated as if the original corporation had re-
ceived the money to which it was entitled.
A recent New York decision, DiTontasso v. Loverro,"0 has again ex-
posed this pitfall for complainant stockholders in derivative suits. The
record on appeal discloses that at the conclusion of the trial the trial court
111. It is difficult to determine whether this problem should be classified in the field
of adjective or of substantive law. It partakes of both fields.
112. Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765 (C.C.A. 8th, 1906), rcz,,
135 Fed. 153 (C. C. E. D.fo. 1905).
113. See 144 Fed. 765, 777 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906). This ruling on a demurrer to the
bill was repeated after trial. 199 Fed. 64 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912), rehearing denied, 203 Fed.
945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913), cert. denied, 229 U. S. 615 (1913).
114. See 233 Fed. 49, 50 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916).
115. See id. at 53.
116. DiTomasso v. Loverro, 276 N. Y. 551, 12 N. E. (2d) 570 (1937).
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ruled in favor of the plaintiff and pointed out in a written opinion: "The
damages, of course, are not to be paid to the plaintiff, as he sues in but
a representative capacity, but they go to the [nominal] defendant Para-
mount Company."" '  To avoid the possibility that certain defendants
who were also stockholders would thereby profit by their own wrong-
doing at the expense of non-stockholder defendants, the court, in a sup-
plemental opinion, computed the total damages sustained by the corpora-
tion on whose behalf suit had been brought, and awarded complainant
only his allocable share; the court also awarded an additional sum to the
corporation "out of which the fees of plaintiff's attorney and the expenses
of the litigation may be paid.""'  But the appellate court held that once
a pro rata share had been awarded to the plaintiff, the trial court had
no power to make any additional provision for the benefit of plaintiff's
counsel." 0
The tremendous amount of work performed by plaintiff's attorneys in
these cases' 20 presents a most significant problem. Where a suit on behalf
of the corporation is successful, the stockholder's attorneys and account-
ants will be compensated out of the total sum recovered by the corporation.
But if the individual award and the statutory costs represent the maxi-
mum the small stockholder can receive, the actual expenses of suit will
usually exceed his total recovery, since he must go to the expense of prov-
ing all he would have been obliged to prove to get redress for the corpora-
tion before his allocable share is determined. This practice, carried to a
logical but socially undesirable conclusion, would enable dishonest direc-
tors to tender a complainant stockholder his proportionate share of the
loot and then interpose this tender as a complete defense, on the theory that
all the plaintiff may recover is his proportionate share of the damages, out
of which he must personally pay his attorney's fees.
The social desirability of encouraging meritorious stockholder's suits-
and only in the case of a successful suit is any recovery and any counsel
117. Ibid., Record on Appeal, if. 1440.
118. Id. at ff. 1441-52.
119. DiTomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N. Y. Supp. 912 (2d Dep't 1937),
aff'd, 276 N. Y. 551, 12 N. E. (2d) 570 (1937), reargument denied, 276 N. Y. 610, 12
N. E. (2d) 601 (1937), 51 HARv. L. REv. 164. The trial court's pro rata award waq
based upon similar procedure in a related case where the plaintiff took no appeal front
the pro rata award and where the issue of counsel fees was never raised. Jacobellis v.
Prudential Ice & Coal Corp., 244 App. Div. 255, 279 N. Y. Supp. 44 (2d Dep't 1935),
modified, 269 N. Y. 632, 200 N. E. 32 (1936).
120. For a summary of legal work performed in the Jones case, see Thompson v.
Bomar, 258 Fed. 339 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919). In the 54 cases cited in Hornstein, supra
note 39, at 794, n. 68, the litigation lasted an average of 5 years; this does not mean
merely lapse of time as in ordinary litigation; in stockholders' suits the work is usually
continuous as long as the litigation lasts, and ordinarily requires the work of several
lawyers working at once.
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fee awarded-plus the patent inconvenience and undesirability of separate
suits by each stockholder to redress the same wrong12' might well lead
to a uniform rule that in the case of the dissolved, as well as the undis-
solved corporation, recovery must be on behalf of and for the benefit of
the corporation. Otherwise, the inability of lawyers to predict with reason-
able certainty who will ultimately pay the enormous expense of suit, cou-
pled with the possibility that a successful complainant may be obliged to
pay it out of his own pocket, will usually be sufficient to deter the com-
plainant from action.
CONCLUSION
The first motivation considered in this article, i.e., the possibility of
cutting down the statute of limitations, can be readily eliminated by enact-
ment of statutes of the California or New Jersey type which do not
further shorten the time limitation in authorizing suits by or against a
dissolved corporation. The second and third incentives, based upon the
doctrine of forum non conveniens and the cost of suit respectively, can
be obviated by the judiciary without the need for any enabling statute.
Proper action, however, on the question of who shall bear the expense
of suit can be guaranteed by a proviso in the dissolution statutes that
"award shall be in favor of the dissolved corporation and not of any
individual stockholder."
An effective and dynamic solution substantially disposing of all three
dangers and uniformly applicable in all states would be the prohibition of
dissolution until after clearance by a federal agency which could be em-
powered to require from those advocating dissolution proof that it is
sought for a proper purpose. At the present time, the SEC may not act
except in the case of merger or consolidation and then only if the "sale"
of new securities is involved: it usually is not."- Since those contemplat-
ing wrongdoing naturally do not employ methods which require them to
resort to judicial proceedings, federal legislation is the only practicable
solution. Such legislation has been recommended" and suggestive pro-
121. The complications resulting when each stockholder may maintain a separate,
individual suit are indicated in Harris v. Pearsall, 116 Misc. 366, 190 N. Y. Supp. 61
(Sup. Ct. 1921), following an earlier individual judgment in Harris v. Rogers, 190 App.
Div. 208, 179 N. Y. Supp. 799 (4th Dept. 1919). Where the complainants are the only
stockholders other than defendants, there is no fear of multiplicity of suits and complain-
ants are awarded only their share of the total damage. Boothe v. Summit Coal
M. Co., 72 Wash. 679, 131 Pac. 252 (1913); Tefft v. Schaefer, 136 Wash. 302, 239 Pac.
837 (1925) ; Silversmith v. Sydeman, 305 Mass. 65, 25 N. E. (2d) 215 (1940).
122-. SEC REPour, supra note 3, (1938) Pt. VII, p. 135, n. 61; p. 249, n. 172.
123. SEC REPoRT, supra note 3, (1940) Pt. VIII, pp. 308 ff., 318 ff.
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visions were included in the original bill for the regulation of investment
trusts,124 as was also the following Declaration of Policy:
"The national public interest and the interest of investors are ad-
versely affected . . . when investment companies are . . .dissolved
.. .without the consent of their security holders and without ade-
quate public supervision."'
1 25
124. S. 3580, same as H. R. 8935, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) § 25.
125. Id. at § 1(6). Both "Declaration of Policy" and specific measures were omitted In
the final Act. INVESTMENT COmPANY AcT OF 1940, 54 STAT. 789 (1940), 15 U. S. C.
§ 80a-1 et seq. (Supp. 1940).
